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A Question of State Action: Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
-, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
The Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury is among those
fundamental rights we enjoy as citizens of the United States. Although the
Fourteenth Amendment speaks of impartiality, trial counsel will often util-
ize voir dire to select the "best" jury for their case. The process of jury
selection occurs in three stages. First, the court must create a jury pool
from which to form the venire.' Second, prospective jurors may be re-
moved for cause by the court.2 Third, both counsel may exercise chal-
lenges, either peremptory or for cause, to exclude venire members from the
jury.,
The right to use a peremptory challenge is statutorily based.4 Histori-
cally, the peremptory challenge allows counsel to strike a prospective juror
"without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."5 The
peremptory challenge thus functions not only to eliminate extremes of par-
tiality on both sides of a litigation, but to assure the "parties that jurors will
decide the case on the basis of the evidence placed before them."6
A growing number of litigants have attacked the peremptory challenge
for being a device for racial discrimination. In Batson v. Kentucky,7 the
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four African-Ameri-
can persons on the venire, leaving an all-white jury.8 The African-Ameri-
can defendant challenged the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenges
on the ground that such use violated his rights under the Sixth and Four-
1. Robert W. Rodriguez, Comment, Batson v. Kentucky: Equal Protection, the Fair Cross-
Section Requirement, and the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 37 EMORY L.J. 755,
756 (1988). The venire is a large group of prospective jurors who are assembled to select the final
jury in a case. Eric D. Katz, Comment, Striking the Peremptory Challenge from Civil Litigation:
"Hey Batson, Stay Where You Belong!"' 11 PACE L. REV. 357, 357 n.1 (1991).
2. Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 756. Venire members may be excused upon showing undue
hardship or extreme inconvenience. Id.
3. Id
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988); FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(b).
5. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). By contrast, the challenge for cause must be
approved by the court and must be based on either actual or implied bias. Lee Goldman, Toward
a Colorblind Jury Selection Process: Applying the "Batson Function" to Peremptory Challenges in
Civil Trials, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 147, 149 (1990).
6. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
7. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
8. Id at 83. Because the defendant was indicted in Kentucky, the trial court used the Ken-
tucky Rules of Criminal Procedure to determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed to
each party. IdL at 83 n.2.
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teenth Amendments.9 The United States Supreme Court held that a prose-
cutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a defendant's
race from the jury, solely on racial grounds, "raises the necessary inference
of purposeful discrimination," thereby implicating the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 °
Even though Batson provided a clear prohibition against the racially-
based use of peremptory challenges by criminal prosecutors,11 it remained
unclear if the Batson rule applied to civil cases. Applying Batson in the
criminal context presented no problem because the prosecutor was regarded
as a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. However, absent a
prosecutor, the question became whether a court-dominated setting, as used
by attorneys for private litigants, presented analogous state action issues in
the civil context.
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,12 the United States Supreme
Court reviewed for the first time a case involving the alleged use of a race-
based peremptory challenge in civil litigation between purely private par-
ties. 3 The Court found the state action necessary to apply the Fourteenth
Amendment, thereby extending the Batson rule to civil cases.14
Edmonson is revolutionary insofar as it extended the meaning of "state
action" to its outermost boundaries. In its quest to eliminate racial discrim-
ination from the jury selection process, the Court applied the Fourteenth
Amendment to a case involving purely civil litigants. This Note will ex-
amine the soundness of the Edmonson decision in light of prior Supreme
Court decisions involving peremptory challenges. In addition, it will ex-
9. Id. at 83. As applied to the individual states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, provides that "no
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The Court expressed no view on whether the racially-based use of
peremptory challenges could violate the Sixth Amendment and relied solely on equal protection
grounds. Id. at 93-94. However, four years later, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment does
not prohibit the exclusion of cognizable groups through peremptory challenges. Holland v. Illi-
nois, 493 U.S. 474, 481-83 (1990).
11. The Batson court did not express any view on whether its prohibition against the racially-
based use of peremptory challenges should apply to the criminal defendant. Batson, 476 U.S. at
89 n.12.
12. 500 U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
13. Prior to Edmonson, all federal cases involved civil rights suits brought against govern-
ment agents or entities. See, e.g., Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 828 (11th Cir. 1989) (defendants
were a police officer and his supervisor); cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); Maloney v. Washing-
ton, 690 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (defendants were the mayor and the police commissioner),
vacated sub nom. Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988).
14. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2080.
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amine cases that declined to find "state action," and it will conclude that
Edmonson's departure from earlier case law is both radical and
inconsistent.
I. STATEMENT OF CASE
Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, an African-American construction
worker, was injured in a job-site accident at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Edmon-
son filed a negligence claim against Leesville Concrete Company in federal
court, claiming that Leesville had negligently contributed to the accident.15
During voir dire,16 the defendant used peremptory challenges to exclude
two of the three African American venire members from the jury. 7 Based
on Batson, Edmonson objected to the defendant's use of peremptory chal-
lenges." More particularly, Edmonson requested that the district court
compel the defendant to state a neutral explanation for the use of the per-
emptory challenges. The district court denied the request, holding that Bat-
son did not apply to civil cases. 9
Despite a jury verdict in Edmonson's favor,20 he appealed the decision
to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds that the defendant had
used the peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion.2 1 A divided
panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling on the issue of the
peremptory challenges.22 The Edmonson panel found that the exercise of a
peremptory challenge in civil litigation constitutes state action for Four-
15. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2079 (1991).
16. Voir dire is the procedure during which venire members are questioned by each counsel
and challenged either for cause or peremptorily. David Park, Note, Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
crete Company, Inc.: Can the "No State Action" Shibboleth Legitimize the Racist Use of Peremp-
tory Challenges in Civil.Actions?, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 271, 273 n.14 (1990).
17. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at -_, 111 S. Ct. at 2081. In civil trials in federal court, each party
may exercise three peremptory challenges. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988). Federal courts allow a
greater number of peremptory challenges in criminal proceedings. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). State
statutes vary with respect to the number of peremptory challenges they allow for civil and crimi-
nal cases. See Goldman, supra note 5, at 150 n. 11.
18. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2081. Batson established a two-prong test to
determine whether prosecutor's use of his or her peremptory challenges is solely motivated by
racial concerns. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). Once a defendant has made a prima facie case, the
state must come forward with a racially-neutral explanation for challenging the prospective mi-
nority jurors. Id. at 97.
19. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at _ 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
20. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Edmonson, but attributed 80% of the negligence
to him, reducing his total damages by 80%, from $90,000 to $18,000. Id.
21. Edmoson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1310 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 895 F.2d
218 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 500 U.S. -_,111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
22. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1315.
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teenth Amendment purposes.23 Thus, the panel held that a racially-based
use of peremptory challenges in a civil action is subject to the Batson Rule
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 The
panel decision was particularly significant because it was the first to extend
Batson to a civil case. Prior to Edmonson, other circuits had applied Batson
to civil cases, but only in civil rights suits against the government.25
The full Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals then ordered rehearing en
banc, 26 but a divided en banc panel affirmed the trial court's decision, hold-
ing that no state action was present. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was held to be inapplicable in this case.27
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in October of
1990.28 Recognizing that the Equal Protection Clause applies only to state
action, the Court used the two-tiered analysis from Lugar v. Edmonson Oil
Co.29 to determine the state action question in Edmonson. First, the Court
considered whether the claimed constitutional deprivation was caused by
the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state. 30 This prong
was satisfied because peremptory challenges are statutorily based.31 Sec-
ond, the Court considered whether the defendant was a state actor.32 The
Court held that this prong, although more difficult to satisfy, was also ful-
filled.33 Thus, with both prongs of the Lugar test satisfied, Edmonson has
emerged as a landmark case that could easily precipitate the end of the
peremptory challenge in American jurisprudence.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
A. Pre-Batson History; the Swain Presumption
The use of the peremptory challenge can be traced to common law. In
England, criminal defendants were allowed to reject a maximum of thirty-
23. Id. at 1311-14.
24. Id. at 1315.
25. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
26. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1317. "En Banc" is defined as "in the bench." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 526 (6th ed. 1990).
27. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
28. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990) (granting certiorari).
29. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
30. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2082-83.
31. Id. at-, 111 S. Ct. 2083. Defendant's use of his peremptory challenges was based on the
provision providing: "In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges."
28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988).
32. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
33. Id. at 2083-87.
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five jurors, whereas the prosecutor could strike an unlimited number.34
This unequal distribution prompted the Crown to change the system. In
1305, an ordinance was enacted requiring the prosecution to show cause for
challenging a juror.35 Eventually, English common law became the basis of
the American judicial system. Although the number of peremptory chal-
lenges allowed by law has varied,36 the nature of the challenge has remained
largely the same-an arbitrary challenge to potential jurors, exercised with-
out judicial interference, for which no cause need be shown.37
As early as 1879, the United States Supreme Court confronted the prob-
lem of racial discrimination in the jury selection process. 38 However, the
Court did not address the issue of racial discrimination in the use of per-
emptory challenges until 1965 in Swain v. Alabama.39 In Swain, an Afri-
can-American defendant was sentenced to death. Although eight African-
Americans were on the venire, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges
to strike six of them, and no African-American served on the actual petit
jury.' The defendant challenged his conviction on the ground that Afri-
can-Americans had been unconstitutionally excluded from the jury."1 The
defendant made three claims: First, that African-Americans were grossly
under-represented on the venire;4 2 second, that the prosecutor, using his
peremptory challenges, had removed the six remaining African-Americans
from the venire;4 3 and third, that no African-American had served on a jury
in that county since 1950."
The Court held that none of these claims violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 With regard to the first claim, the
Court noted that a defendant is "not constitutionally entitled to demand a
34. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1965).
35. Id. at 213. England still follows this system, except that the defendant is now limited to
seven peremptory challenges. Id. at 213 n.12.
36. Id at 214-15. For instance, an early Act of Congress provided for thirty-five peremptory
challenges in trials for treason, and twenty in trials for other capital felonies. Id at 214 (constru-
ing 1 Stat. 119 (1790)). Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now controls the
number of peremptory challenges allowed in criminal cases. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(b). Civil
litigants are allowed to exercise three peremptory challenges. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988).
37. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212 n.9, 220.
38. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880) (holding that discrimination
against African-Americans in the assembling of juries violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
39. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
40. Id. at 205. The two other African Americans on the venire were exempted. Id.
41. Id at 203.
42. Id at 205, 208-09.
43. Id at 210-11, 222.
44. Id at 209, 222, 224.
45. Id. at 209, 224.
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proportionate number of members of his race" either on the venire or on
the jury.46 With regard to the second claim, the Court held that peremp-
tory challenges were exempted from Fourteenth Amendment review be-
cause of the presumption that the prosecutor used the challenges "to obtain
a fair and impartial jury."'4 7 The Court based this presumption on two fac-
tors: (1) the historic purpose of the peremptory challenge, which is to en-
sure a jury free from bias and the appearance of bias;48 and (2) the very
nature of the peremptory challenge, which by definition must be exercised
with complete freedom and not be subject to inquiry or review.49 With
regard to the third claim, the Court held that proof that no African-Ameri-
cans had served on a jury in that county since 1950 was insufficient alone to
rebut the presumption of proper use by the prosecution. 0 To rebut this
presumption, the Court required the defendant to prove that the prosecutor
was solely responsible for the exclusion of African-Americans from previ-
ous juries." Because the defendant could not meet this burden of proof, his
claim failed."
The Swain presumption was severely criticized by later decisions and
commentators because of the crippling burden it placed on defendants. 3 In
46. Id. at 208.
47. Id. at 222. However, this presumption was rebuttable:
If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a criminal case, the
presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome. Such proof might support a
reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to
the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is being used to
deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of
justice enjoyed by the white population. These ends the peremptory challenge is not
designed to facilitate or justify.
Id. at 224.
48. Id. at 211-12, 219.
49. Id. at 219-20. The Court explained: "For it is, as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and capri-
cious right; and it must be exercised with full freedom or it fails of its full purpose." Id. at 219
(quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)).
50. Id. at 224, 226.
51. Id. at 226-27. The Court stated:
[When the prosecutory in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the
removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners
and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on
petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on added significance. In these
circumstances... it would appear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being
perverted.
Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 224, 226.
53. The Swain burden of proof was referred to by one court as "Mission Impossible." Mc-
Cray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984),judgment vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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fact, in only two cases between 1965 and 1986, both decided by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, were criminal defendants able to make a
prima facie showing of systematic exclusion under the Swain presump-
tion. 4 Thus, state and federal courts began to find alternatives to avoid this
presumption.55 Eventually, criticism and dissatisfaction induced change,
and Swain was finally overruled by Batson v. Kentucky5 6 in 1986.
B. Batson v. Kentucky
In Batson, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all
four African-Americans on the venire.57 The defendant, a male African-
American, was sentenced by an all-white jury on charges of second-degree
burglary and receipt of stolen goods. At trial, the defendant moved to dis-
charge the jury, alleging that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.58 The trial court re-
jected the defendant's Equal Protection Clause and Sixth Amendment
claims, and on appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court afrmed the trial
54. See State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979) (holding that the defendant had
satisfied the Swain presumption when: (1) Three attorneys testified that the prosecutor had previ-
ously and systematically used his peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors who were
African-American, and (2) the prosecutor did not deny the attorneys' testimonies and stated that
he had excluded African-Americans from the petit jury in previous trials because they "generally
voted not guilty" where you had an African-American defendant); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751
(La. 1979) (holding that the Swain presumption was met where two attorneys testified that the
prosecutor had systematically used his peremptory challenges to exclude black venire members
from the petit jury).
55. In attempting to avoid the Swain presumption, the courts took three different routes.
First, some courts avoided the confrontation with the Equal Protection Clause and based their
decisions on the Sixth Amendment impartial jury guarantee. See, eg., McCray, 750 F.2d at 1113;
People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978). Second, other courts relied on their state constitu-
tions to extend additional rights to the criminal defendant. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d
748 (Cal. 1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979), cerL denied, 444 U.S.
881 (1979). Third, some federal courts relied on their inherent supervisory power. See, e.g.,
United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated on reh'g, 783 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.
1986) (en banc).
56. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
57. Batson, 467 U.S. at 83.
58. Id
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court's ruling. 9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari6 and
reversed the lower court exclusively on equal protection grounds. 1
In overruling Swain, the Court held that the defendant may show pur-
poseful discrimination in jury selection based solely on the facts of the par-
ticular case 2.6  The Court noted Swain's emphasis on the historic role of the
peremptory challenge and the need to guard its integrity by protecting it
from scrutiny. However, the Court held that those concerns were out-
weighed by the harm that discrimination causes to the accused, the prospec-
tive juror, and the general community. The Court observed that defendants
are harmed by such discrimination because their liberty is at stake, the pro-
spective juror is harmed because discrimination determines his or her com-
petency to serve on the jury, and the general community is harmed because
such discrimination undermines confidence in the judicial system. 3
The Batson Court replaced the Swain presumption with a new test that
allows a defendant to establish an equal protection violation based on dis-
crimination on the facts of the case alone.64 Following Batson, a defendant
may establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by demonstrating
three things. First, defendants must show that they are a member of a cog-
nizable racial group.65 Second, the defendant must demonstrate that the
prosecutor used the peremptory challenges to remove venire members of
the defendant's race.66 Third, the defendant must show that the facts and
other relevant circumstances raise an inference of racial discrimination by
the prosecutor. 7 Once a prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the
prosecutor who must come forward with race-neutral explanations for the
peremptory challenges. 65 After considering the prosecutor's explanations
59. Id. at 83-84. The defendant argued that the exclusion of prospective black jurors by the
prosecutor violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury drawn from
a representative cross-section of the community. Id. at 83. The defendant also argued that the
prosecutor's challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id
60. Id. at 79.
61. Id at 84. The Court refused to decide whether the prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges had violated the Sixth Amendment. Id at 84 n.4. The Supreme Court resolved this issue
at a later date. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
62. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
63. Id. at 87.
64. Id at 96. However, Batson displaced, but did not eliminate the Swain presumption. That
presumption is alive and well, available for any party who may be able to satisfy it.
65. Id.
66. Id Recently, the Supreme Court changed this requirement and held that a criminal de-
fendant, regardless of race, may object to a prosecutor's race-based exclusion of persons from the
jury. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
67. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
68. Id. at 97. The Court stated:
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and all other relevant circumstances, the court must rule on whether the
defendant has proved purposeful discrimination.6 9
C. Supreme Court Cases After Batson
The Supreme Court considered the applicability of the Sixth Amend-
ment to the exercise of peremptory challenges in Holland v. Illinois.70 In
Holland, the Court addressed two issues: First, whether a white defendant
has standing to challenge the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude all African-American venire members; 71 and second,
whether the exclusion of those venire members violates a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury.72
With respect to the first issue, the Court held that a white defendant
does have standing under the Sixth Amendment to challenge the prosecu-
tor's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from
the venire.7- With respect to the second issue, however, the Court rejected
the defendant's argument that "a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
to eliminate a distinctive group in the community deprives the defendant of
a Sixth Amendment right to the 'fair possibility' of a representative jury."74
Holland thus made it clear that no criminal defendant could argue a Sixth
Amendment violation against a prosecutor's racially-based use of peremp-
tory challenges.
In Powers v. Ohio,75 the Court expanded the Batson presumption. In
Powers, a white defendant challenged the prosecutor's peremptory removal
of seven African-American venire members. The Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a prosecutor's
racially-based use of peremptory challenges, even though the criminal de-
fendant and the excluded venire members did not share the same race.76
Today, therefore, the Batson presumption simply requires the excluded ve-
[Ihe prosecutor's explanation need not raise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge
for cause .... But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of
discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the
assumption--or his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant be-
cause of their shared race.
Id.
69. Id. at 96-97.
70. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
71. Id. at 475-76.
72. Id. at 476.
73. Id. at 477.
74. Id. at 478.
75. 500 U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
76. Id. at_, 111 S. Ct. at 1370.
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nire members to be members of a "cognizable" racial group, regardless of
whether the defendant is member of that same racial group.
D. Reaction of Lower Courts to Batson
After Batson, lower courts were divided as to whether the Batson pre-
sumption, as modified, applied outside the criminal context. Because Bat-
son was based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, a
violation could only occur if there were state action. Several circuits held
that state action existed even in civil cases, and thus applied Batson in the
civil context.77 The Supreme Court of Alabama and other lower courts
held likewise.78 Other circuits, however, held that Batson did not apply to
civil cases.79 This division among the courts compelled the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.8 °
III. EDMONSON v. LEESVILLE CONCRETE Co.
A. Majority Opinion
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ,1 the United States Supreme
Court held that a private litigant in a civil case may not use peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors because of their race.82 Recognizing that the
Equal Protection Clause only applies to action by the government, the
Court focused on whether state action could be found in civil litigation. 3
The Court followed the two-prong test set forth in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil
Co.84 to decide this question."5 First, the Court examined whether the al-
leged constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or priv-
ilege created by the state.86 The Court disposed of this prong fairly quickly,
observing that a federal statute confers the right to exercise peremptory
challenges.87 The Court further noted that without such congressional au-
thorization, the defendant "would not have been able to engage in the al-
77. See Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990); Fludd v. Dykes, 863
F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
78. See Thomas v. Diversified Contractors, Inc., 551 So. 2d 343 (Ala. 1989); City of
Bridgeport v. Clark, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986).
79. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2077.
80. 500 U.S. , I1l S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
81. 500 U.S. , S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
82. Id. at , 111 S. Ct. at 2080.
83. Id. at , 111 S. Ct. at 2082.
84. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
85. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2082.
86. Id. at, 111 S. Ct. at 2082-83.
87. Id. at., 111 S. Ct. at 2083. Defendant Leesville's peremptory challenge were authorized
by 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988). Id.
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leged discriminatory acts."88 Thus, the Court concluded that the first
prong of the test was fulfilled. 89
Second, the Court considered whether the private party charged with
the deprivation could be fairly described as a state actor.90 The Court ex-
amined three factors: (1) the extent to which the private party relied on
government assistance or benefits; (2) whether the private party performed
a traditional government function; and (3) whether the constitutional injury
was aggravated in a unique way because of government intervention.91
Applying these factors to the civil lawsuit at bar, the Court noted that
the defendant Leesville had relied on government assistance in its use of
peremptory challenges.92 Without the "overt, significant participation of
the government," the peremptory challenge system would not exist. 93 More
specifically, the Court regarded the participation of the trial judge as "direct
and indispensable" to the peremptory challenge system as a whole, since by
its act of striking the venire member pursuant to a challenge, the court
condones such discrimination. 94
Second, the Court observed that the defendant had performed a tradi-
tional government function.95 The peremptory challenge was a tool used to
select one of our most traditional government entities, the jury.96 Further,
the Court noted that if the government confers on a private party the power
to select government officials, such as jurors, that party should "be bound
by the constitutional mandate of race-neutrality." 97
The Court concluded that the constitutional injury suffered by Edmon-
son was made more severe because the government allowed the discrimina-
tion to occur within the courtroom itself.98 With all three factors satisfied,
88. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at _, 111 S. Ct. at 2083. The Court stated: "Peremptory challenges
are permitted only when the government, by statute or decisional law, deems it appropriate to
allow parties to exclude a given number of persons who otherwise would satisfy the requirements
for service on the petit jury." Id
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id
92. Id. at__ 111 S. Ct. at 2084-85.
93. Id. at 111 S. Ct. at 2084.
94. Id. at , 111 S. Ct. at 2085. The Court explained that "[b]y enforcing a discriminatory
peremptory challenge, the Court 'has not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has
elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination.'" Id (quot-
ing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
95. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at _, I I1 S. Ct. at 2085.
96. Id. at . 11 S. Ct. at 2085-86.
97. Id. at 111 S. Ct. at 2085.
98. Id. at 111 S. Ct. at 2087.
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the Court held that the second prong of the Lugar test was met.99 Because
the state action issue was resolved, the Edmonson court was able to extend
Fourteenth Amendment protection, and the Batson rule, to civil cases."°°
B. Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority stating that a peremptory
strike by a private party is a private, rather than a state action. 101 In Justice
O'Connor's view, the criterion to establish state action had not been satis-
fied. First, Justice O'Connor argued that there was no overt and significant
participation by the government in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 1O2
O'Connor regarded congressional participation in setting up the peremp-
tory challenge system, and the judge's control over voir dire, as "merely
prerequisites to the use of a peremptory challenge." 10 3
Justice O'Connor also disagreed that the use of peremptory challenges is
a traditional government function, because a private party's reason for us-
ing such challenges is not the same as the state's reason. ° 4 Peremptory
challenges, argued O'Connor, are exercised by a party, not for the selection
of jurors, but for their exclusion whereas the "traditional government func-
tion" is to seat qualified jurors. 10' Therefore, the government and the pri-
vate party seek different ends. 106
: Finally, O'Connor stated that the use of a peremptory challenge by a
private party is not state action simply because it takes place in the court-
room. 0 7 O'Connor relied on Polk County v. Dodson 10 8 to illustrate that a
99. Id. at, ll S. Ct. at 2083.
100. Id. at, Ill S. Ct. at 2087-89.
101. Id. at , 11 S. Ct. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at , 111 S. Ct. at 2090-92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at.., 111 S. Ct. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor explained that
the only participation by the government in the peremptory challenge system involves the judge's
dismissal of the venire member once the private party has exercised his or her peremptory chal-
lenge. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This action by the trial judge, argued O'Connor, constitutes
no significant participation by the government. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2092 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
106. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2092-95 (O'Connor J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated:
A government attorney who uses a peremptory challenge on behalf of the client is, by
definition, representing the government. The challenge thereby becomes state action. It is
antithetical to the nature of our adversarial process, however, to say that a private attorney
acting on behalf of a private client represents the government for constitutional purposes.
IdM at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
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lawyer's actions in a courtroom do not become state action simply because
of their location. 0 9
2. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia's dissent was primarily based on public policy, arguing
that the Edmonson decision could harm criminal defendants. 110 Justice
Scalia pointed out that prior to Edmonson, the Batson presumption only
affected prosecutors. However, it was conceivable that Edmonson would
prevent a minority defendant in a criminal action from challenging an all-
white jury, or seating as many jurors of his own race as desired."' More-
over, Justice Scalia stated that the Edmonson rule would substantially in-
crease the time devoted by lawyers and judges to implementing the
peremptory challenge system.'12
VI. ANALYSIS
Edmonson represents the last of the Supreme Court's slow steps toward
eliminating racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. With
Edmonson, the Court has sent a clear and commendable message to the
lower courts-racial discrimination has no place in the use of such chal-
lenges, even if the case involves purely civil litigants.
Nevertheless, the Edmonson rationale is troubling. In its quest to elimi-
nate racial discrimination, the Court stretched the concept of state action to
its limit. Under the Edmonson rationale, the judicial system and the trial
judge become state actors as soon as a private litigant makes a peremptory
challenge. This conclusion is simply not supported by prior Supreme Court
cases that have dealt with the issue of state action. In fact, Edmonson may
create unintended problems in future cases.
To illustrate this point, it would be a worthwhile exercise to analyze
previous state action cases under the Edmonson framework. For instance,
in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.," 3 the Supreme Court held that the
109. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at _, 111 S. Ct. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia said:
The concrete benefits of the Court's newly discovered constitutional rule are problematic.
It will not necessarily be a net help rather than a hinderance to minority litigants in ob-
taining racially diverse juries. In criminal cases, [Batson] already prevents the prosecution
from using race-based strikes. The effect of today's decision . . . will be to prevent
the defendant from doing so-so that the minority defendant can no longer seek to prevent
an all-white jury, or to seat as many jurors of his own race as possible.
Id. (emphasis added).
112. IdM at , 111 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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action of a privately owned, highly regulated utility is not necessarily state
action unless the state has encouraged or commanded the action. 1 4 Mere
approval by a government commission of the utility's conduct is insufficient
to make such conduct state action."' The same result might not be ob-
tained, however, under an Edmonson rationale. Just as the government's
approval in Jackson was not state action, a trial judge who merely approves
the use of a peremptory challenge by excusing the excluded member, should
also not be considered a state actor. The trial judge does not "actively en-
courage or command" a litigant to exclude any potential juror through per-
emptory challenges.
Similarly, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,116 the Court held that the actions
of a private, publicly funded, highly regulated school do not constitute state
action unless the actions are compelled or influenced by the state, or unless
the school performs a function which has been "traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State." '117 If Kohn were decided today, the plaintiff
teachers who were dismissed could successfully argue that the school's ac-
tions constituted state action even if the government did not compel or in-
fluence its actions. Furthermore, the argument that private schools do not
perform traditional government functions becomes meaningless following
Edmonson because Edmonson held that the use of peremptory challenges is
state action even though the challenges are not within the exclusive prerog-
ative of the state.
In Cuyler v. Sullivan,118 the Court held that a criminal defendant who
retains private counsel and a criminal defendant who has counsel appointed
by the state are afforded the same constitutional protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment.119 The Court reasoned that the mere participation of a
state government in the criminal trial process constitutes state action for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes.1 20 Therefore, the Court concluded that
the conduct of both retained and appointed counsel in a criminal trial in-
volves state action. 121
The Edmonson Court has apparently extended the Cuyler rationale. In
Cuyler, the Court applied Fourteenth Amendment protection to defendants
114. Id. at 357 n.17.
115. Id.
116. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
117. Id. at 841-42 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
118. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
119. Id. at 344-45.
120. Id. at 344. The Court stated that "the State's conduct in a criminal trial itself implicates
the State in the defendant's conviction. Id.
121. Id. at 344-45.
[Vol. 75:707
A QUESTION OF STATE ACTION
who had either retained or appointed counsel because a state criminal trial
involves state action. However, the Edmonson Court found state action in a
civil case simply because of the state's participation in the peremptory chal-
lenge process. In Edmonson, the Court expanded Cuyler, which had ap-
plied only in the criminal context, to any case, criminal or civil, in which
there is any involvement by the state. Therefore, in light of Edmonson, a
civil litigant with retained counsel could now argue that the Cuyler decision
extends protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, in Polk County v. Dodson,122 the Supreme Court held that a
public defender, employed by the state, does not act under color of state law
when representing a defendant in a criminal case.123 The Court recognized
that a public defender, represents the client and not the state. '24
In Edmonson, however, the Court held that an attorney's exercise of
peremptory challenges on the client's behalf constitutes state action because
the challenge is implicitly sanctioned by the court. In light of Edmonson, if
Dodson were heard today, the Court would treat a public defender as a state
actor simply because the public defender had discharged representation ob-
ligations in the courtroom. The distinction drawn in Dodson, between the
public defender's employer (the government) and the public defender's ethi-
cal interests (the client) becomes meaningless following Edmonson.
Edmonson is inconsistent with prior Supreme Court decisions on the
issue of state action. By avoiding the prior strict state action analyses, the
Court was able to extend state action to purely private litigation. Although
this result may alleviate the problem of racial discrimination in the jury
selection process, it may have less desirable results in other contexts. Ulti-
mately, the Edmonson Court weighed the substance of the claim (racial dis-
crimination in the use of peremptory challenges) against the need for
consistency with respect to other state action precedent, and sacrificed
consistency.
V. CONCLUSION
In Edmonson, the Supreme Court took the final step to ensure that all
citizens, regardless of race, will have an equal opportunity to sit as jurors.
Although that result is laudable, the state action analysis represents a radi-
122. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
123. Id. at 325.
124. Ia at 318-19. This holding seems to contradict the Court's holding in Cuyler v. Sulli-
van, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), in which the Court held that the conduct of retained and appointed
counsel in a criminal case constitutes state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. See id. at
342-45.
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cal and inconsistent departure from earlier state action decisions. It is
likely that Edmonson will confuse, rather than help, lower courts faced with
future state action decisions. The Supreme Court must re-examine its state
action framework to provide lower courts with guidance. In so doing, it
must establish a workable definition for state action which is consistent with
earlier precedent.
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PREFACE
The Marquette Law Review is pleased to present the following sympo-
sium on the United States Supreme Court. Although articles frequently
appear that criticize or commend recent Court decisions, the articles con-
tained in this symposium are dedicated to the institutional role of the
Court-more than the merits of particular decisions or decision-making
theories.
The Honorable Richard A. Posner has recently written:
Constitutional scholarship is a weak area of academic law, despite
the prominence and prestige of its leading figures. Most of what
passes for constitutional scholarship is heavily tendentious commen-
tary on recent decisions by the Supreme Court....
Instead of endless debate over the soundness of recent Supreme
Court decisions, I recommend disinterested research on constitu-
tional law conceived of as a social phenomenon to be studied, not
necessarily to be criticized or changed.1
The Marquette Law Review has published this issue in an attempt to
address Judge Posner's concerns. We have attempted to avoid commentary
on recent Supreme Court decisions and have instead focused on constitu-
tional law as a social phenomenon.
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1. Richard A. Posner, Constitutional Scholarship: What Next? 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 17,
17, 18 (1988).

